Modern.az reports that Associate Professor Małgorzata Kamola-Cieślik of the University of Szczecin, Poland, has answered questions regarding Azerbaijan’s growing role in the European Union’s energy security.
– Looking back, how would you assess the energy security of the European Union, including Poland, before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022?
– Before the war, the European Union imported around 45% of its natural gas, nearly 30% of its crude oil, and about 45% of its coal from the Russian Federation. Germany, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were the most dependent on Russian gas. High dependence on oil and coal was also recorded in Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
In 2006, the Polish government decided to build the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, in response to a gas crisis. That crisis stemmed from a dispute between Russia and Ukraine, which disrupted the transit of Russian gas to European countries, including Poland. Construction of the terminal began in 2011, and it was put into operation in 2015. At the same time, work began on the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, connecting Poland to gas fields in Norway. The final investment decision was made in November 2018. The pipeline was launched in October 2022, reaching full capacity a month later. Poland also expanded its underground gas storage facilities, located among others in Wierzchowice, Mogilno and Kosakowo, which helped limit the effects of supply disruptions in 2022.
Replacing Russian raw materials required time and substantial financial investment across the entire European Union. An additional challenge was the EU’s Fit for 55 climate package, adopted in July 2021, which set a target of cutting emissions by at least 55% by 2030. After the outbreak of the war, the EU had to simultaneously accelerate its independence from Russian fuels and pursue its energy transition goals.
– In July 2022, the European Commission signed a memorandum on strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. What role did this country play in the EU’s new energy landscape?
– In May 2022, the European Union presented the REPowerEU plan. Its main goal was to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels through supply diversification, the development of renewable energy sources, and improved energy efficiency. The EU introduced an embargo on Russian coal and a ban on imports of Russian oil delivered by sea. Imports of LNG were increased, mainly from the United States and Qatar, and cooperation was expanded with Norway and Azerbaijan. On 18 July 2022, a memorandum on strategic partnership in the field of energy was signed in Baku between the EU and Azerbaijan. The document was signed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in the presence of EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson and Azerbaijan’s Minister of Energy, Parviz Shahbazov. The agreement provided for the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor, comprising the TANAP and TAP pipelines, so that by 2027 gas supplies from Azerbaijan to the EU would reach at least 20 billion cubic metres per year. Gas from Azerbaijan was intended to go mainly to Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. After the launch of the Greece-Bulgaria interconnector (IGB), the possibilities for supplies to South-Eastern Europe increased. Further infrastructure development is expected to enable supplies to Romania and Serbia as well. This cooperation, however, did not begin with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. As early as 2021, around 8.1 billion cubic metres of Azerbaijani gas reached Southern Europe. The 2022 memorandum therefore expanded an existing partnership and strengthened Azerbaijan’s role as an alternative gas supplier for the EU.
– Individual EU member states also began building their own bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. Which countries formed the strongest resource ties with Baku, and what does the transmission infrastructure for these supplies look like?
– Individual EU member states began developing their own bilateral energy relations with Azerbaijan, mainly in the area of gas supplies. The strongest ties with Baku were forged by Italy, Greece and Bulgaria, and in subsequent years also by Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. Supplies are carried mainly through the Southern Gas Corridor, whose European section is the TAP pipeline, running from the Turkish-Greek border through Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. It should be noted that Italy is the largest recipient of Azerbaijani gas in the EU. Greece and Bulgaria, in turn, gained access to this resource through their connection to the TAP system. For Bulgaria, the Greece-Bulgaria interconnector (IGB), launched commercially in October 2022, was of particular importance. It allowed for increased imports of Azerbaijani gas and reduced dependence on Russian supplies. Romania began its own cooperation with Azerbaijan in December 2022, when Romgaz signed its first individual gas supply agreement with SOCAR Trading. Deliveries began in January 2023 via the TAP system and the Greece-Bulgaria interconnector. Azerbaijan’s role for Central and Eastern Europe is expected to grow further through the Solidarity Ring initiative, launched in 2023 by transmission operators from Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia together with SOCAR. Cooperation also extends to crude oil, transported via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines.
– What does the future hold for the agreement on importing raw materials from Azerbaijan to the EU? Are the solutions adopted meant to be permanent or transitional, and what is Poland’s position in this context?
– Energy cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan is part of a broader strategy of energy supply diversification. It should, however, be regarded as a transitional solution rather than a permanent model of EU energy security. Azerbaijani gas reduces dependence on Russian raw materials during the period of energy transition. The EU’s long-term goal remains reducing the use of fossil fuels and developing renewable energy sources. This is confirmed by the growing cooperation with Azerbaijan in the field of green energy. On 17 December 2022, in Bucharest, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary signed an agreement on the Black Sea Submarine Cable project, an undersea power cable connecting Georgia and Romania across the Black Sea. The cable will be around 1,195 km long, with a transmission capacity of 1 GW, and will enable the export of electricity from Azerbaijani wind and solar farms to Europe. The project has been included in the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, with completion planned by the end of the current decade. From Poland’s perspective, cooperation with Azerbaijan is mainly indirect in nature. Poland is not a direct recipient of Azerbaijani gas, as it has no connection to the Southern Gas Corridor. Poland’s energy security relies primarily on its own infrastructure, namely the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, the Baltic Pipe pipeline and connections with other European countries, as well as on imports of raw materials from Norway, Qatar and the United States. Polish-Azerbaijani relations have been developing since 2017, when Presidents Andrzej Duda and Ilham Aliyev signed a roadmap for strategic partnership in Warsaw. Cooperation covers, among other things, energy, trade and transport. The Polish company LOTOS signed a letter of intent with SOCAR on joint business analyses, showing that the relationship also had an economic dimension. Poland benefits from the development of EU-Azerbaijan relations mainly through the increased stability of the European energy market, although it is not currently a direct participant in this supply corridor.
Małgorzata Kamola-Cieślik – Associate Professor at the University of Szczecin, Poland. Her research focuses on political and economic transformations in Poland and the European Union, with particular emphasis on the shipbuilding industry, energy security, and cybersecurity in the energy sector. Since 2018, she has served as the Editor-in-Chief of Acta Politica Polonica, the academic journal of the Institute of Political and Security Sciences at the University of Szczecin. ORCID: 0000-0003-2956-3969, e-mail: [email protected].
Mənbə: Modern.az
